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Renegotiation is a common practice in procurement auctions which allows for post-
auction price adjustments and is nominally intended to deal with the problem that
sellers might underestimate the eventual costs of a project during the auction. Using a
combination of theory and experiments, we examine the e¤ectiveness of renegotiation at
solving this problem. Our ndings demonstrate that renegotiation is rarely successful
at solving the problem of sellers misestimating costs. The primary e¤ect of allowing
renegotiation is that it advantages sellers who possess a credible commitment of default
should they have underbid the project. Renegotiation allows these weaker types of sellers
to win more often and it also allows them to leverage their commitment of default into
higher prices in renegotiation from a buyer.
JEL Codes: C91, D44, D82
Key Words: Procurement auctions, renegotiation, bankruptcy, default, experi-
ments
1 Introduction
A common problem in procurement auctions is that a seller will not know the true cost of
completing the project at issue when placing a bid. Projects that require a longer time frame
to complete could experience substantial labor and materials cost shifts over the course of
the project that may not be foreseeable prior to the auction. Also, unexpected di¢ culties
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may emerge requiring additional design work, or di¤erent production technologies that
were unanticipated during the bidding phase. Despite these di¢ culties, these costs must be
estimated prior to an auction in order for a seller to be able to construct a bid they expect
to be protable. Due to the cost uncertainty it is likely that some sellers will overestimate
the nal cost while others will underestimate it. If the procurement auction takes the
form of a standard low-price auction in which the lowest bid wins and the winning seller is
paid their bid, then it is likely to be the case that the winning seller will be the one that
underestimated the cost of the project by more than any of his competitors. If unaccounted
for in the bidding behavior, this adverse selection is what leads to the well-known Winners
Curse phenomenon and can lead to substantial losses for the sellers.
The existence and prevalence of the Winners Curse has been well documented in both
the lab and the eld (see for example Kagel and Levin (1986a); Charness and Levin (2009);
Bajari and Hortacsu (2003)). What this literature demonstrates is that bidders nd it quite
di¢ cult to learn to correct their bidding behavior for the fact that conditional upon winning
they learn that they had the lowest estimate of the cost.
In a procurement context, the exceptionally low bids that a buyer receives should be
a concern to both parties in the transaction. Of course, the seller should be concerned
that they will potentially lose money, but the buyer should also be concerned due to the
possibility that the seller may default on the project before it is completed. This problem
is clearly a major issue for those who engage in procurement as a number of di¤erent
mechanisms have been developed to combat it. One common practice involves an auctioneer
removing bids from consideration that are deemed too low.1 Harstad and Rothkopf (1995)
examine a similar option in a standard common value auction where winning bidders can
withdraw bids. Chen, Xu, and Whinston (2010) suggests that the way to deal with the
problem involves contingent contracting though their aim is to solve a slightly di¤erent,
though related problem where a seller is under-delivering quality. Calveras, Ganuza, and
Hauk (2004) propose a solution to the problem of sellers going bankrupt midway through
a project which consists of a surety bond that the winning seller must pay for that will
compensate the buyer in the event that the seller fails to complete the project. Chang,
Chen, and Salmon (2012) and Decarolis (2011) examine the use of an average bid auction
in which the winning bidder is the one who bids closest to the average.
One of the more commonly used mechanisms to deal with the possibility that a seller
has underbid, and the focus of this study, is renegotiating the terms of a contract after it is
awarded. Two well-known examples of post-award renegotiation would be the North South
metro line in Amsterdam and the Big Dig in Boston. Contractors working for the City
of Amsterdam began construction of a new North-South line of their metro to go through
the central part of the city in 2002. The initial budget was set at e1.46 billion but after
multiple rounds of renegotiating, it had risen to e3.1 billion by 2009. It was originally
intended to be completed by 2011, but latest estimates now suggest it might be completed
1For example, the US O¢ ce of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, which is responsible
for supervising acquisition for the Department of Defense, has the following policy for unreasonable low
bids (FAR 14.407- 3(g)): If the evidence does not reasonably support the existence of a mistake and the




by 2017. The Big Dig in Boston has su¤ered similar problems leading to over $1 billion in
renegotiated payments to the construction rms involved.2 While these are highly visible
examples of renegotiation following a competitive bidding process, the phenomenon occurs
in a wide range of situations. Decarolis (2012) examines a data set of procurement auctions
in Italy and nds that much of the price reduction achieved by using auctions for the
procurement process are lost through renegotiation. Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2011)
provide estimates of what they call adaptation costs in highway paving contracts which
amount to an 8-14% increase in the nal price over the initial price set by auction. Gil and
Oudot (2009) argue that due to the potential need for renegotiation, complex procurement
projects should not even be allocated using auctions.
While renegotiations clearly occur, there is a question as to whether the mechanism ac-
tually solves the problem it is intended to or whether it instead creates unintended incentive
e¤ects, thereby causing other problems in the procurement process. Wang (2000) provides
a theoretical argument for how allowing for post-auction renegotiation could help a buyer
obtain lower prices but this is in a private value environment in which there is no Winners
Curse problem to deal with. In a common or a¢ liated values environment, the theoretical
argument for how renegotiation could resolve the problem is less clear. The goal for a buyer
would be to use renegotiation to help sellers who accidentally bid too low avoid default,
and by doing so the buyer hopes to avoid additional recontracting costs associated with
nding another seller to complete the project. While this does mean the buyer expects to
pay higher prices through renegotiation, the buyer may well be satised with that trade-o¤
if recontracting costs are too high.
The purpose of this study is to determine if there is a theoretical argument for why/how
renegotiation might solve this problem and to provide experimental evidence on whether it
can succeed empirically. We begin with a theoretical analysis of how renegotiation a¤ects
bidding behavior in the auction and the procurement process overall. One issue that be-
comes immediately apparent is that in order for renegotiation to have any impact on the
process, from a theoretical perspective, the winning seller must have a credible commitment
to abandon the project after learning his true costs. If a seller lacks such a credible com-
mitment, then the buyer will have no incentive to renegotiate a higher price and a seller
clearly never has the incentive to renegotiate a lower price. To account for this we exam-
ine situations in which sellers have varied degrees of credible commitment to default. The
commitment to default will be modeled on the premise that rms di¤er according to their
size and borrowing/loss constraints. One can well imagine large rms with deep pockets
who have the ability to sustain losses on individual projects choosing to absorb those losses
rather than abandon the project. This is because such rms might face substantial costs
from defaulting on one bad deal due to the possibility that such an action could have adverse
consequences on multiple other projects in which the rm is engaged. On the other hand,
smaller rms may be unable to complete projects whose price is lower than the costs due
to liquidity constraints. For ease of analysis, we restrict our theoretical environment to two
types of sellers: strong sellers who can (and will) accommodate any losses without choosing
to default and weak sellers who cannot absorb any losses and so default under any loss.3
2The Boston Globe maintains a repository of information on the history of the Big Dig at
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/big_dig_problems/
3The starkness of these assumptions are not necessary for the main comparative statics in the theory.
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We nd little reason to believe that renegotiation will help alleviate losses associated with
the Winners Curse problem in procurement auctions. Our theoretical analysis shows that
when all sellers are strong, renegotiation should never be expected to occur as buyers will
reject all o¤ers knowing strong sellers can absorb losses. However, when wealth constrained
bidders are added to the population of sellers, we nd that renegotiation can substantially
change the incentives of the auction stage. In theory, with a mix of weak and strong sellers,
the expectation is that weak sellers should win all projects at very low prices and then use
their credibility to default as leverage to negotiate a nal price much more favorable to the
seller. While this may decrease seller losses, it does so at substantial expense to the buyer
and due to the asymmetric advantage of the weak seller it also leads to negative e¢ ciency
consequences. We then perform an experimental test to determine if these predictions hold
as people may behave di¤erently than theory predicts. We nd that the theory performs
quite well in predicting the comparative statics of how people behave and it is also useful
in predicting the relative nature of auction outcomes. This leads to our nding in the
experiments that renegotiation is not an e¤ective means of solving the Winners Curse
problems in this environment.
There are prior studies which examine aspects of this problem but none deal directly
with the issue of whether renegotiation does or does not help to correct for losses associated
with the Winners Curse in procurement auctions. Waehrer (1995), Roelofs (2002), and
Parlane (2003) all examine auctions with default options used by bidders to examine the
impact of limited liability on auction outcomes. Waehrer (1995) and Parlane (2003) provide
theoretical examinations of how limited liability a¤ects bidding behavior in an environment
assuming private values with uncertainty. Waehrer (1995) does allow for renegotiation but
since the environment does not allow for a Winners Curse the results do not speak to the
issues we are concerned with. Shachat and Tan (2013) also investigate procurement auc-
tions with renegotiation when sellers have independent private costs (no Winners Curse).
Renegotiation in their environment involves buyers initiating the process to lower the pur-
chase price while our environment is the reverse with winning sellers initiating renegotiation
in an attempt to raise the selling price. Roelofs (2002) also examines a case closer to ours
as he provides both a theoretical and experimental examination of how limited liability
among bidders in a common value setting can alter bidding behavior. This limited liability
treatment is somewhat similar to how we implement wealth constrained sellers, but it does
not include renegotiation. Wealth constrained bidders in the procurement context have also
been examined empirically by Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), but their focus is on the
use of preferential treatment policies within an auction mechanism to help overcome costs
of entry for weak bidders.
In the next section we will explain the theoretical environment and the predictions for
bidding and renegotiation behavior. Section 3 will describe the design of the experiment.
Section 4 will present the results and we conclude in section 5 with a discussion of what the
results from this study suggest regarding the use of renegotiations following procurement
auctions.
We discuss in more detail later how relaxing this strong assumption will a¤ect our results.
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2 Theory
We analyze a procurement auction with n sellers bidding for a project o¤ered by one buyer.
The model is constructed around experimental treatments which investigate the e¤ects of
post-auction renegotiation between the winning seller and buyer, and bidders with wealth
asymmetry. The environment we use is based on the private plus common value structure
introduced in Goeree and O¤erman (2003) and Goeree and O¤erman (2002). Translated
into the procurement setting, this structure assumes that the total cost facing a seller, ci; is
composed of both private and common costs. We assume that the private portion of a sellers
cost, ti; is drawn independently for each of the n bidders from a common distribution. Each
bidder is also assumed to receive a signal,  i; which is independently drawn from another
common distribution related to the common cost element. A bidders total cost is equal to
their private cost plus the common cost,  , which is equal to the average of all of individual
signals. This can be represented as






For the experiments we assume n = 4; while ti is drawn from a uniform distribution
over the range [0; 50] and  i is drawn from a uniform distribution on the range [0; 100]: We
further assume that the value of the buyer is high enough such that they would be willing
to buy under any cost realization, or vb = 150:
The auction structure we investigate is the standard low price procurement auction in
which sellers simultaneously submit a bid, bi; and the lowest bid wins and sets the auction
price, p = minjfbjg. The earnings of the winner are equal to the auction price less the true
cost or p  ci, and the buyer earns vb  p. In some treatments we will add a renegotiation
stage which follows the auction. In the renegotiation stage we allow the winning seller to




n , and then make a take it or leave it o¤er of a new
transaction price, f , to the buyer. If the buyer accepts the o¤er then that o¤er becomes
the new transaction price and the buyer will earn vb  f while the winning seller receives
earnings of f   ci. If the buyer rejects, then the transaction price remains the price which
resulted from the auction. When making his decision, the buyer will not be able to observe
the total cost of the seller, but he will know the distribution of possible costs.
We will assume the existence of two types of bidders - strong and weak. Strong bidders
are assumed to be able to absorb losses and so any losses they make are simply represented
as negative earnings. In contrast, weak bidders will be assumed to default upon su¤ering a
loss of any size. This default will result in a penalty to the seller, k; and recontracting costs,
r; to the buyer. For the experiment we assume that the default penalty su¤ered by the
seller is k = 50 and the recontracting cost for the buyer is r = 25. During the auction, the
number of weak and strong sellers is common knowledge and in the event of a renegotiation
phase, a buyer knows whether or not they face a strong or weak winning seller.
In order to understand the e¤ects of allowing renegotiation we must analyze this model
under conditions where renegotiation is and is not allowed. Similarly, in order to understand
how the asymmetric liability of sellers a¤ects outcomes we also need to analyze the model
in the presence and absence of the weak sellers. This leads to 4 di¤erent scenarios which
we address in turn to provide a characterization of the bidding behavior in each case.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium bid function for Baseline and Renegotiation treatments.
2.1 Baseline
The baseline condition refers to the case in which only strong sellers are included in the
auction and renegotiation is not allowed. The bidding behavior in this environment can
be derived in a straightforward manner based on Goeree and O¤erman (2003) and we will
mimic the notation used in Milgrom and Weber (1982). We rst construct a combined
cost signal of xi = ti +  i=4 which represents the information available to seller i about
his nal cost when placing his bid. As all bidders are symmetric strong bidders, in this
environment we will focus on bidder 1 who has a combined cost signal x1 = t1+ 1=4. If we
let X1 be equal to the expected minimum combined signal out of n draws and Y1 be equal
to the expected minimum combined signal out of n  1 draws that are above X1; then the
equilibrium bid function can be expressed as
b(xi) = E( + tijx1 = xi; X1 = xi) + E(Y1  X1jx1 = xi; X1 = xi): (2)
The rst component is an estimate of the cost to bidder i; assuming his signal is the lowest,
while the second represents an estimate of the di¤erence between the expected lowest and
second lowest combined signals given that bidder i has the lowest signal.
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the baseline bid function, given the distributional as-
sumptions used in the experiment.4
2.2 Renegotiation
We now add the possibility of renegotiation after the auction between the winning seller
and buyer. We maintain the assumption of the baseline that all sellers are strong types
4The full derivation of the baseline bid function with the distributional assumptions can be found in the
appendix.
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who can absorb losses. As this is a two stage game with imperfect information, we use
backward induction to solve for a weak perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In the second
stage, we can assume that the auction has concluded yielding some price, p: While the
buyer does not observe the sellers cost, he knows that all sellers are strong which implies
that the probability of default for any winning seller is 0. Thus, any belief structure over
costs yields equivalent decisions by the buyer. If the seller o¤ers any price f > p; then the
buyer can accept and pay a price of f or reject and pay the lower price of p: It is clearly
a best response to reject any o¤er of f > p: A seller could in principle o¤er some f < p;
which the buyer would accept, but this is clearly dominated behavior for the seller. The
result of this analysis is that we observe there to be a multiplicity of equilibria involving
the sellers making any o¤er f  p and the buyer rejecting any of those o¤ers. In all cases
the nal transaction price stays at the auction price, p:
Since the nal transaction price will always stay at the level set by the auction, there is
no change in the incentives during the auction stage. The equilibrium bidding behavior is
therefore the same between the baseline and renegotiation cases. This is an important result
because it demonstrates that the only way renegotiation can a¤ect the auction outcome is
when the winning seller may possibly default on the project.
2.3 Wealth
Our third case removes the option of renegotiation and introduces asymmetric bidders. Half
of the bidders are strong sellers who can absorb all losses, and the remaining half are weak
sellers who will default if they make losses in the auction stage. Defaulting forces the weak
seller to accept a penalty of k and imposes recontracting costs, r; on the buyer. We assume
that k is larger than the loss from the auction, so defaulting does not serve as a form of
limited liability.5 In this case, default by the weak seller substantially increases the potential
damage from underestimating the cost of the project as any bid, even slightly under the
true cost, will lead to a substantial loss. In contrast, strong sellers do not face the threat of
additional costs when the true cost is misjudged. This asymmetry in liability constraints
leads to a change in the incentives underlying bidding behavior. Weak sellers essentially bid
as if they possess a loss averse utility function, as they must bid to avoid any losses, while
strong sellers do not.
Solving for closed form bid functions for both strong and weak sellers is not tractable
for this case. We have chosen instead to construct the bid functions using a computational
method. This approach involves calculating the expected utility to a seller from following a
specied function for their type using a simulations method assuming that the other three
sellers are using the proposed bid functions for their type. We then determine whether
there are protable deviations from the proposed function for a seller of either type by
calculating the best response bid function for both types. If protable deviation for either
type is possible, a new function can be proposed and tested using the same criteria.6 This
5The default penalty, k, can be interpreted as the closure of the rm, or the present value of reputation
loss in future transactions as a rm who defaulted.
6Bid functions were approximated using splines over the point estimate of the best response that resulted
from the simulation process. While the spline process was relatively exible, we did impose shape primitives
on the process which are based on the theoretical assumptions for these bid functions. Specically, we
estimated a monotonically increasing polynomial where the bid for the maximum combined cost signal is
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Figure 2: Equilibrium bid functions for strong and weak bidders in Wealth treatment.
process iterates until we nd a xed point for both functions, i.e. a set of functions for that
are best responses to themselves. Due to the computational nature of the approximations,
nding a precise xed point is impractical so we ended the computational search process
using a tolerance level dened by a measure equal to the sum of the square of the distance
between the initial and best response bid functions at every value of xi:7 We have veried
this approximation procedure by using it to reproduce the analytical bid function derived
in the baseline case and we have checked the robustness of the solution by verifying that
we obtain the same function starting from multiple initial proposals, including at bid
functions.
Figure 2 graphically displays the bid functions for this case. The qualitative nature of
these bid functions is quite intuitive. The weak sellers bid less aggressively than the strong
sellers to avoid the possibility of even small losses. The strong sellers are able to bid more
aggressively as they do not su¤er from the same serious consequences related to small losses.
The e¤ect of this di¤erence is that at equivalent cost draws strong sellers will be advantaged
over weak, allowing them to win more often.
2.4 Wealth and Renegotiation
The nal environment combines both renegotiation and asymmetric bidders. The presence
of weak sellers changes the outcome from what is observed under renegotiation without
asymmetry due to the fact that the weak bidders have a fully credible commitment to default
if they end up losing money at the conclusion of all nal transactions. The equilibrium
concept necessary for this environment is a weak perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium as we
must specify the beliefs held by the buyer regarding the probability with which the seller
equal to 150, the highest possible cost, b(x) = c. A detailed algorithm is available from the authors upon
request.
7The iterative process continued until the tolerance level of both weak and strong estimated bids fell
below 0.001.
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they are facing will default at the transaction price from the auction.8 Let h 2 fw; sg dene
the type of the seller and let (p; f; h) be the belief on the part of the buyer regarding
the probability with which the seller they are facing will go bankrupt if the nal price is
the winning bid observed in the auction, p; given the price requested in renegotiation,
f; and the type of the seller, h: The set of equilibrium strategies for the bidders can be
characterized by:
bw(xi) = 0 (3)
fw(ci; bi) = 175 (4)
bs(xi) > 0 (5)
fs (ci; bi)  bi (6)
Note that the o¤ers made by the sellers in the renegotiation stage can be conditioned on
their true cost, ci; rather than just their combined cost signal, xi; due to the fact that the
sellers learn their true cost at the conclusion of the auction and prior to making the rene-
gotiation o¤er. The choice for the buyers in the renegotiation stage, D 2 fAccept; Rejectg;
must be accompanied by an appropriate set of beliefs regarding the probability with which
they believe a seller will default after a rejection. Both can be characterized as follows:
D(p; f; h) =
8>><>>:
Reject if h = s & f > p
Accept if h = s & f  p
Accept if h = w & p = 0 & f  175
Reject if h = w & p > 0 & f > 0
(7)
(p; f; h) =
8<:
0 if h = s
1 if h = w & p = 0
0 if h = w & p > 0
(8)
The justication for this set of strategies and beliefs being an equilibrium is straightfor-
ward. In equilibrium, all weak sellers should bid 0 to maximize their chances of winning in
the auction stage regardless of their observed combined signal. In the renegotiation stage,
the buyer will expect that a weak seller who has bid 0 will default with probability 1 if the
o¤er is rejected.9 Recall that in the event a seller defaults, the recontracting cost for the
buyer is r = 25 and the value of the completed project to the buyer is vb = 150: Conse-
quently a buyer will expect to receive utility of  25 for rejecting an o¤er of the weak seller
or 150  f for accepting. A rational buyer accepts so long as 150  f   25 or f  175: A
weak seller therefore maximizes his earnings by setting f = 175.
Technically we must dene beliefs and actions for the buyer o¤ the equilibrium path,
8Technically the beliefs should be over the type or cost of that seller with those beliefs about type
determining the beliefs about the probability of default. It is notationally more convenient to make the
beliefs directly about the default probability and so we have chosen to represent them that way. Since
the beliefs about type and default probability have a direct relationship between them, this choice has no
important consequences.
9 It is technically possible, given the discrete distributions used in the experiment, for a subject to have a
true cost equal to 0 and therefore not default at that price. This involves receiving ti = 0 and then  j = 0





= 1:88 10 10: We feel justied in the choice to
round this to 0 for convenience.
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i.e. for when a weak seller is observed to bid a positive amount. Since it is impossible for a
weak seller to ever do better than a price of 175 it matters little what these o¤ equilibrium
path beliefs and actions are so we will assume that the buyer assumes the bid was perfectly
revealing of true cost and that the seller will never go bankrupt leading to a reaction of
always rejecting. Any alternative belief structure works as well, including one in which the
buyer accepts any o¤er less than or equal to 175, regardless of the auction price.
Given that weak sellers will bid 0, a strong seller can never bid in such a way so as to
protably win the auction. The best response by the strong seller is to bid anything greater
than 0 to ensure losing. In the o¤-equilibrium case that the strong seller wins, again any
renegotiation o¤er they request will be rejected by the buyer if it is above the auction price
as the buyer knows with certainty that the strong seller will not default. Of course the
buyer will happily accept an o¤er below the auction price though the seller should never
o¤er that. Consequently the strong seller can request anything greater than or equal to the
auction price and it will be rejected by the buyer.
While there are multiple equilibria corresponding to di¤erent ways of specifying the
strategy of the strong sellers and the o¤-equilibrium path beliefs/actions of the buyer, all
of these equilibria have the same outcome. Every auction results in a tie between the weak
sellers and that tie is broken randomly. The winning weak seller then makes a renegotiation
request of 175, which the buyer accepts.
While the environment we have set up with weak sellers that default on any loss is an
extreme case, the general nature of the equilibrium structure will hold constant for di¤erent
ways of specifying the default threshold. So long as a weak seller can demonstrate a credible
commitment to default with a very low winning bid, he will have leverage in post-auction
renegotiations. This is something that should be possible for most alternative specications
of weak sellers since realistic cost distributions should be bounded away from zero. In the
conclusion we will return to a discussion of these issues including discussing the degree to
which practices like excluding abnormally low bids can eliminate this possibility. Yet, before
determining if such practices might work we must rst determine if a problem exists in their
absence and so we specify and test this more extreme environment.
3 Experimental Design
The experimental design consists of four treatments which correspond to each of the the-
oretical environments described above: Baseline (B), Renegotiation (R), Wealth (W), and
Wealth & Renegotiation (W&R). Each session of the experiment consisted of a single treat-
ment. At the beginning of a session the subjects were randomly assigned to either the role
of buyer or seller and that role assignment remained constant over the entire experiment.
As already noted, the cost environment used a direct translation of the private plus com-
mon value structure of Goeree and O¤erman (2003) to the procurement setting. All costs
and values in the experiment were denominated in experimental currency units (ECUs).
The private cost element, ti; was drawn from a uniform distribution on the range [0; 50] and
the common cost element,  i; was drawn from a uniform distribution on the range [0; 100]:
There were four bidders in each auction, and the total cost to any bidder i was equal to




4 . The value of the project to the buyer in each round of the auction was
always 150, which is equivalent to the maximum possible cost.
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B R W W&R
Buyer $52.35 $38.53
Seller $23.07 $23.45 $22.33 $27.11
Table 1: Average earnings by treatments.
In all treatments, each period began with a standard low price procurement auction in
which the subjects in the role of seller would be told of their draws of ti and  i and then
asked to place a bid. The winning bid was the lowest submitted and that bid determined
the auction price. In the treatments without renegotiation, the auction determined the nal
outcome. In the treatments with renegotiation the winning seller from the auction stage
was informed of the true cost and then allowed to submit a take it or leave it o¤er to the
buyer if they chose to. If that o¤er was accepted it became the nal transaction price while
if it was rejected, the auction price remained the nal transaction price. In the Baseline and
Renegotiation treatments all auctions had four strong sellers, none of whom could default
on a project. In the Wealth and Wealth & Renegotiation treatments there were two weak
sellers and two strong sellers per auction. In contrast to the strong sellers, the weak sellers
defaulted if they experienced any loss. In the event of default, a subject in the role of a
weak seller was charged a 50 ECU default penalty while the buyer faced a 25 ECU cost.
Subjects in the role of buyer were informed of the closing auction price, the price requested
in renegotiation, and whether the winning seller was strong or weak. The buyer did not
know the sellers exact cost, only the distribution of possible costs.
We conducted 3 sessions for each treatment yielding a total of 12 sessions. Each session
consisted of 30 rounds. To ensure the least amount of changes between sessions, we used
the exact same signal draws across all treatments. In the sessions without renegotiation we
had 16 subjects in the role of sellers with no humans in the role of the (completely passive)
buyers. In the sessions with renegotiation we had 16 sellers and 4 buyers.10 Sellers and
buyers were randomly matched into groups each period.
As subjects could and are expected to make losses in these experiments, we endowed
subjects with initial balances to hopefully ensure that they would not have negative cumula-
tive earnings at any point in time. We set the seller endowment at 375 ECUs while the buyer
endowment was set at 150 ECUs. As it was still possible, even with those endowments,
for individuals to achieve a negative overall balance, we employed some standard rules for
dealing with the bankruptcy prospect. The rules allowed for subjects who go bankrupt a
single time to be re-initialized with a new endowment. Any subject who went bankrupt a
second time was removed from the session and received only their participation fee. In the
end, eight subjects went bankrupt once and one subject went bankrupt twice.
Due to the fact that buyers were expected to earn substantially more ECUs than sellers,
we used di¤erent conversion rates for converting ECUs into USD for the two roles. For those
in the role of sellers, 1 ECU=$0.04 and for those in the role of buyers, 1 ECU=$0.015. This
lead to overall earnings of $45.73 for the buyers and $23.93 for the sellers which includes
the $10 participation fee. Table 1 shows the earnings broken down by type and treatment.
10One session in the Renegotiation treatment had only 3 buyers and 12 sellers due to a smaller than
expected number of subjects showing up that day.
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3.1 Hypotheses
The preceding theoretical analysis in conjunction with the experimental design sets up a
series of hypotheses that can be empirically tested. In this section, we briey state our
primary hypotheses of interest to guide the data analysis in the results section.
Hypothesis 1 There will be no observed di¤erence in bidding behavior or auction outcomes
between the B and R treatments.
This rst hypothesis proceeds from the fact that all renegotiation requests from strong
sellers are expected to be rejected and whether renegotiation is allowed or not should be
irrelevant if subjects act as theory suggests. It is certainly possible though that a di¤erent
behavioral norm could emerge. Many prior studies (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze
(1982); Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986); Rabin (1993); Fehr and Schmidt (1999))
indicate that individuals often have a concern for fairness, or more generally, the welfare of
other people. Other prior studies also suggest that some individuals have a bias towards
honesty in their behavior (Charness and Dufwenberg (2006); López-Pérez and Spiegelman
(2013); Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)). If both sorts of behavior transfer into this
environment, then it is possible that a norm develops in which sellers bid in good faith
during the R treatment (i.e. they bid no di¤erently from the B treatment) and then only
request renegotiation when they nd out that they are losing money. The buyers might
then decide, since they value the welfare of the other, to accept the renegotiation o¤er if
they deem it a reasonable split of the potential surplus. The development of such norms
seems unlikely but behavior along these lines is what would be necessary for renegotiation
to help mitigate losses for the winning seller  in particular losses sustained by winners
su¤ering from the Winners Curse.
Hypothesis 2 Strong sellers will bid more aggressively than Weak sellers in the W treat-
ment and this will be reversed in the W&R treatment.
Hypothesis 3 Strong sellers will win more often than weak sellers in the W treatment
while weak sellers will win more often in the W&R treatment.
The support for both of these hypotheses falls directly out of the predictions of bidding
behavior in the two treatments. In the W treatment, the weak sellers must bid conservatively
to avoid losses which trigger a considerable default penalty, while the strong sellers can bid
more aggressively as they simply absorb losses rather than default. This means the strong
sellers will be advantaged in the W treatment. For the weak sellers, the opportunity to
engage in renegotiation with the credible threat of default will have a substantial impact on
their bidding behavior, allowing them to bid much more aggressively when renegotiation is
an option. This shift in bidding behavior will have the consequence that weak sellers will
now be able to win more often than strong in the W&R treatment.
Hypothesis 4 All renegotiation o¤ers by Strong sellers will be rejected in both R and W&R
treatments. Renegotiation o¤ers by Weak sellers will be more likely to be accepted at lower
auction closing prices.
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According to the equilibrium structure, all renegotiation requests by strong sellers should
be rejected while all weak sellers should bid 0, request a renegotiated price of 175, which
should then be accepted by the buyer. In regard to the o¤ers by strong sellers, there is
no self-interested rationale for why buyers would ever do anything else. However, the case
is not as clear with weak sellers. Therefore, in our hypothesis we have accounted for how
buyers may respond if weak sellers do not make bids/o¤ers in exact accordance with the
theoretical prediction. If the winning weak seller wins the auction at a price above zero,
self-interested buyers may not always want to accept renegotiation o¤ers. As there are an
innite number of ways to specify o¤ equilibrium path behaviors for the buyers, we do not
see a reason to specify a single one for testing purposes. We argue though that any plausible
model for how buyers should respond to a weak sellers renegotiation attempt would be that
a buyer is more likely to accept an o¤er if the auction price is lower since the probability
that the winning seller is expected to default at that price is higher. On the other hand, if
an auction closes at a relatively high price then a reasonable expectation is that the default
risk is lower and so a buyer might take the chance and reject that o¤er.
Hypothesis 5 Final transaction prices will be rank ordered such that PW&R > PW and
PB = PR. Seller losses should be ordered in the reverse.
Of ultimate importance to those involved in these types of auctions is this last hypothesis
which ranks the nal transaction prices paid by buyers and the expected losses to sellers.
According to the equilibria derived above, the W&R treatment clearly delivers the highest
price and the B and R treatments are clearly expected to be equivalent. According to
the equilibria, there should be no losses in expectation among the sellers. Of course, from
many prior experiments with common/a¢ liated values environments (e.g. Kagel and Levin
(1986b); Kagel and Richard (2001)) we know that individuals are highly unlikely to bid
exactly as theory predicts and that losses are likely. If the price ranking remains robust




We begin by displaying summary statistics of the data from the experiments. The hypothe-
ses stated above will be formally tested in the next sections but prior to seeing the regression
analysis, it is informative to examine the simple statistics which emerge from the data.
Table 2 contains summary statistics on revenue, e¢ ciency, and buyer surplus. We
include average auction prices in addition to average nal prices for the R and W&R treat-
ments to demonstrate how much of the change in observed revenue is due to renegotiation.
Auction price, nal price, and buyer surplus data are the same for the B and W sessions
since renegotiation is not possible.11
11 In the case of default, the nal price is recorded as the last price from the auction if there was no
renegotiation, or if renegotiation was refused.
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By hypothesis 5, auction prices are equivalent between the B and R treatments because
renegotiation should never be successful. The average auction price in R (59.38) is approx-
imately equivalent to B (61.35). Auction prices in the W&R treatment are theoretically
predicted to equal 0, and while we do not observe prices at the zero level, we do nd that
auction prices in this treatment are substantially lower than the W treatment and all other
treatments.
Comparing auction prices to nal prices for the treatments with renegotiation, there
appears to be little di¤erence between the auction price and the nal price for the R treat-
ment. For the W&R treatment we see a large di¤erence between the average auction price
(27.95) and the average nal price (79.10) and that average nal price is higher than the
average nal price in all other treatments, even though it is still lower than the theoretical
prediction of 175.
Table 2 also includes measures of e¢ ciency. The possibility of seller default in this
environment generates two types of e¢ ciency - auction e¢ ciency which is the equal to the
fraction of the total possible surplus that was realized at the end of the auction, and nal
e¢ ciency which is measured in an identical manner, but accounts for situations where the
weak seller defaulted and no surplus is realized.12 The auction e¢ ciencies in the B, R, and
W treatments are all similar, scoring about 90% e¢ cient. This compares with an random
auction e¢ ciency of 82% which would have been achieved had the auction been won by a
randomly selected seller.13 The auction e¢ ciency achieved by the W&R treatment (87%)
appears lower than the other treatments, though it is still higher than what would be
generated by random assignment.
In the treatments with asymmetric bidders (W and W&R), weak sellers default in the
event of a loss which may lead to a di¤erent nal e¢ ciency because under default the
realized surplus and resulting nal e¢ ciency are zero. In the W treatment, renegotiation
cannot help the weak seller overcome auction losses and as a result this drastically lowers
e¢ ciency to 74% from 91% achieved at the auction stage. While renegotiation was possible
in the W&R treatment, the nal e¢ ciency was still lower than the auction e¢ ciency due to
the fact that some renegotiation o¤ers were rejected leading to default.14.
How well the buyers fared in each treatment is summarized by buyer surplus. At the
auction stage this is measured as the value of the buyer less the price paid in the auction.
The buyers nal surplus accounts for changes due to renegotiation and default. If a new
price was renegotiated, the surplus is updated using the new transaction price and under
default the buyers surplus is set to -25, the penalty imposed on the buyer. Of course, the
buyers surplus from the auction is inversely related to the auction price. The nal surplus
is of more interest because it incorporates both renegotiated changes in price and default.
It is evident that the nal surplus of the buyer is substantially lower with asymmetric
12The buyers value is 150, so the maximum possible surplus is equal to 150 minus the lowest cost realization
in the bidding group. The surplus achieved is equal to 150 minus the cost of the winning seller. In the case
of default, the calculation of nal e¢ ciency assumes the achieved surplus is 0.
13This random e¢ ciency is high because of the substantial common value element to the value structure.
14Final e¢ ciency changes based on the frequency of default for weak sellers. Out of 240 auctions in the
W&R treatment where weak won, 27 (11.25%) resulted in losses and default after renegotiation. In the W
treatment, weak won in a 139 cases, 72 (52%) of which resulted in losses and default. Even though default
was only 11% of outcomes under W&R, the complete loss of any realized surplus is substantial enough to
dramatically decrease e¢ ciency.
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Treatment Price (predicted) E¢ ciency Buyer Surplus
Auction Final Auction Random Allocation Final Auction Final
B 61.35 (77.31) 61.35 (77.31) 0.90 0.82 0.90 88.65 88.65
R 59.38 (77.56) 60.79 (77.56) 0.90 0.82 0.90 90.62 89.21
W 62.35 (76.82) 62.35 (76.82) 0.91 0.82 0.74 87.65 64.24
W&R 27.95 (0) 79.10 (175) 0.87 0.82 0.80 122.05 58.47













































Table 3: Propensity of strong/weak sellers to win auction. Average o¤ers made and
accepted o¤ers by type and treatment (frequencies in parentheses below).
wealth constraints (due to occasional defaults) and there is no indication that renegotiation
is helpful to the buyer.
Table 3 provides summary statistics on the propensity of each type of seller to win in each
treatment as well as average o¤ers and average accepted o¤ers. As predicted in hypothesis
3, strong sellers win more often than weak sellers in the W treatment (221 versus 139, or
strong sellers win 61% of the time) while the weak sellers win more often in the W&R
treatment (90 versus 240, or weak sellers win 73% of the time). Turning to renegotiation,
we note that the average o¤er made by strong sellers, 79.62, is higher than the average
accepted o¤er is 67.73 and that the average accepted o¤er is not much higher than the
average auction price for R (61.35) presented in table 2. In contrast, the average o¤er made
by weak sellers in the W&R treatment, 102.36, is roughly equivalent to the average accepted
weak o¤er and much higher than the average auction price (27.95). By hypothesis 4, all
strong o¤ers should be rejected while weak o¤ers are more likely to be accepted. In the
W&R treatment, buyers accepted 92% of the o¤ers made by weak sellers, whereas only 12
o¤ers (out of 89, or 13%) were accepted from strong sellers. In R, renegotiation is slightly
more successful for strong sellers as 25% (83 out of 331) of strong o¤ers are accepted by the
buyer.
Losses may be excessive at the auction stage in B, R, and W, if bidders fall prey to the
Winners Curse and bid too low, failing to account for the adverse selection issue associated
with winning. In the W&R treatment, we also expect losses except that in this case its
not because of the Winners Curse, but because renegotiation changes the incentives of
the auction stage which theoretically results in winning bids at a price of zero and losses
amounting to the full true cost. To learn how severe the losses associated with low strategic
bidding and the Winners Curse are in the data, table 4 shows the average earnings per
round, broken out by seller type and treatment. It contains average earnings as well as
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Earnings: Auction Prices Earnings: Final Prices Losses: Auction Prices Losses: Final Prices
Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak
B -8.72 - -8.72 - -20.58 - -20.58 -
R -11.31 - -9.91 - -23.63 - -25.47 -
W -7.27 -5.56 -7.27 -19.27 -21.02 -23.54 -21.02 -50
W&R -31.92 -49.93 -27.48 19.96 -35.01 -52.67 -34.66 -50
Table 4: Average earnings and losses by winning seller.
# Losses at Auction Prices # Losses at Final Prices
Strong Weak Strong Weak
B 229 (64%) - 229 (64%) -
R 236 (66%) - 216 (61%) -
W 129 (58%) 72 (52%) 129 (58%) 72 (52%)
W&R 83 (92%) 229 (95%) 76 (84%) 27 (11%)
Table 5: Propensity to make losses by treatment.
the average size of loss which is conditioned on negative earnings. Table 5 then shows
the propensity of sellers to make losses again broken down by seller type and treatment.
The very clear picture is that the problem of seller losses is severe in this environment. In
all treatments strong sellers have negative earnings conditional upon winning an auction.
The only class of sellers that have positive expected earnings are weak sellers in the W&R
treatment. In other treatments, winning sellers lose money approximately 50-60% of the
time but weak sellers in the W&R treatment only makes losses 11% of the time.
4.2 Analysis of Bidding Behavior
We begin the analysis of sellersbidding behavior by examining Figures 3 and 4, which are
scatterplots of bids versus the combined cost signals. The gures also include regression
plots and lines indicating the relevant equilibrium bidding behavior. Figure 3 provides the
plots for the strong sellers in the B and R treatments. Theoretically, the bids are identical
for strong sellers between these two treatments and visually the behavior is quite similar.
However, in both treatments, sellers are bidding more aggressively than predicted.
Figure 4 examines the behavior in the asymmetric wealth treatments, W and W&R,
for both strong and weak sellers. Theoretically there are signicant di¤erences predicted in
bidding behavior between the treatments. In the W treatment, strong sellers are predicted
to be more aggressive than weak and indeed the regression line through those points is
lower than that for the weak sellers. The opposite is predicted in the W&R treatment and
we observe the predicted switch in regression lines. We do not represent the equilibrium in
the W&R panel as there is no distinct prediction for the strong sellers; the strong sellers
are simply predicted to bid above the weak sellers. The weak sellers are predicted to bid 0
which clearly only a few do.
While the gures help provide an intuitive idea for how the sellers submitted bids,
statistical tests for the visual properties noted above can be found in Tables 6 and 7. Table
6 contains three regressions based on the data from the B and R treatments to examine
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Figure 3: Bids plotted against combined signals for strong sellers in B and R treatments.
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Figure 4: Plots of bids versus combined signals for weak and strong sellers in the W and
W&R treatments.
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the di¤erences between those two treatments. All regressions use the bid submitted by the
seller (all are strong in those treatments) in a round as the dependent variable and have
standard errors clustered by subject. The rst two specications are random e¤ect panel
regressions and test whether there is a di¤erence in behavior between when renegotiation
is and is not present. We also include a dummy variable, L; to capture situations in which
sellers have low balances to see if they bid di¤erently from cases when they do not have low
balances. The last specication presents a test of whether observed bidding behavior di¤ers
from equilibrium behavior in a pooled OLS regression, used to eliminate the constant from
the regression.
Result 1 There is no statistically signicant di¤erence in bidding behavior between the B
and R treatments.
The support for the rst result is provided by the fact that in models 1 and 2 the dummy
variable for the renegotiation treatment, R, is insignicant. We also have provided several
interactions between that and other variables and these too are mostly insignicant. Result
1 conrms hypothesis 1.
Result 2 Bidding behavior in both the B and R treatments is more aggressive than pre-
dicted.
To test the relationship between theory and what sellers actually bid, in model 3 we
use the theoretically predicted bid as an independent variable rather than the signal and
include an interaction with the treatment. If subjects were bidding as theory predicted, the
coe¢ cient on the variable bi would be equal to 1 and the interaction would be equal to 0.
While the coe¢ cient on the interaction is not signicantly di¤erent from 0, the coe¢ cient on
bi is less than 1 and is signicantly di¤erent from 1 (p < 0:001) as is the linear combination
of the two which captures the total e¤ect for the Renegotiation treatment (p < 0:001). This
provides support for result 2.
For the W and W&R treatments we predict in hypothesis 2 that bidding behavior should
shift between the treatments. In the W treatment, weak bidders should bid less aggressively
than strong. In the W&R treatment, this relationship is reversed. We provide tests of the
comparative static predictions and also a general test of how well the theory explains the
behavior in the W treatment.
Result 3 In the W treatment, strong sellers bid more aggressively than weak sellers. In
the W&R treatment, weak sellers bid more aggressively than strong sellers.
The statistical support for result 3 is derived from the rst two columns in table 7.
Column 1 provides a regression specication looking at how bids in the W treatment depend
on the combined cost signal and on type. Column 2 provides the same specication for
the W&R treatment. We nd that the dummy variable for the strong seller is negative
and signicant in the W treatment specication and positive and signicant in the W&R
treatment. This is the comparative static predicted by hypothesis 2.
Result 4 In the W treatment, sellers of both types bid more aggressively than predicted.
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(1) (2) (3)
Combined cost signal, xi 0.817 0.819 Equilibrium Bid, bi 0.914
(0.034) (0.046) (0.019)
Renegotiation, R -2.595 -2.251 bi R -0.027
(2.347) (3.498) (0.024)








Observations 2,864 2,864 2,864
Clusters 96 96 96
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Random e¤ects regressions with bid as dependent variable using data from B
and R treatments only.
To examine whether we observe behavior corresponding to the specic predictions of the
theory, for the W&R treatment it is informative enough to examine the right side panel in
Figure 4. We have no specic prediction for strong sellers in that treatment but the weak
sellers are predicted to bid 0. They clearly do not, though as we just saw, they do bid more
aggressively than the strong sellers. So while the specic prediction fails, the comparative
static still holds. For the W treatment we do have specic predictions of bid functions for
both types and regressions testing conformance with those bid functions are contained in
columns 3 and 4. These are again pooled OLS regressions with the standard errors clustered
on the subjects without an intercept term. Similar to what was observed in the B and R
treatments, we nd that bidders of both types bid more aggressively than predicted as the
coe¢ cients on the predicted bid are signicantly less than 1 (for both p < 0:001). This
provides the support for result 4.
4.3 Analysis of Renegotiation Behavior
The renegotiation stage involves a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er between the winning seller and
the buyer. Theoretically, all o¤ers made by strong sellers should be rejected as these sellers
can absorb any losses made in the auction. In contrast, when renegotiation is allowed, weak
bidders are predicted to bid zero which almost always implies losses at the auction stage
and as a result any o¤er made by weak sellers less than or equal to 175 will be accepted
by buyers to avoid default by the weak seller. As seen in the previous analysis of bidding
behavior, zero bids by weak sellers are infrequent, and so as stated in hypothesis 4, we
expect that a weaker property will hold which is that a buyer should be more likely to
accept an o¤er if the auction price is lower.
A rst look at the accept/reject decisions is seen in Figure 5 which provides histograms
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W Only W&R Only W Only
Strong Bidders Weak Bidders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Combined cost signal, xi 0.937 0.808
(0.054) (0.098)
Strong seller, S -6.591 17.08
(2.237) (6.672)
S  xi -0.027 0.053
(0.055) (0.113)




Observations 1,433 1,320 715 718
Clusters 48 44 48 48
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Random e¤ects regressions with bid as dependent variable using data from
noted treatment and bidder type only.
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Figure 5: Histograms of o¤ers by seller type.
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(1) (2) (3)
Auction price, p 0.003 0.008 Best Response O¤er 0.907
(0.003) (0.005) (0.049)
Renegotiation o¤er, f -0.011 -0.014
(0.002) (0.005)
Weak seller, WS 0.902 0.976
(0.036) (0.027)
WS  p -0.011
(0.006)
WS  f -0.003
(0.005)
Wealth & Renegotiation, W&R -0.059 0.023
(0.198) (0.204)
f < p + 10 0.197 0.131
(0.075) (0.094)
Clusters 23 23 39
Observations 659 659 239
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Marginal e¤ects from probit regressions with acceptance of renegotiation o¤er as
the dependent variable.
of all o¤ers by seller type indicating which o¤ers are accepted versus rejected. It is clearly
the case that o¤ers by strong sellers are almost always rejected, as predicted, and o¤ers by
weak sellers are typically accepted. There is also an indication that o¤ers by weak sellers
at high levels do get rejected.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 8 provide marginal e¤ects from probit regressions with agree-
ment to a new o¤er as the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the subject
level. We include a dummy, f < p + 10, to account for o¤ers that are near the auction
price and a limited number of o¤ers made by sellers below the auction price.
Result 5 Buyers are more willing to accept o¤ers made by weak sellers than strong.
Result 6 Buyers willingness to accept is decreasing in the level of the o¤er.
Support for result 5 is derived from the positive coe¢ cient on the dummy for a winning
weak seller which is signicant across both specications. As what is shown in the table are
the marginal e¤ects, the fact that the coe¢ cient is above 0.90 indicates that this is by far
the most substantial determinant in whether an o¤er is accepted or rejected. This provides
robust verication that buyers are much more willing to accept the o¤ers of weak sellers
than they are strong sellers. The support for result 6 is found in the negative and signicant
coe¢ cient on the o¤er variable. Thus both parts of hypothesis 4 on renegotiation behavior
have been supported.
The o¤er/reject behavior we observe is consistent with the comparative statics of the
model but there are important deviations from the theoretical predictions. The average
o¤er made by weak sellers is 102.36 (see table 3), which is relatively far from the predicted
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o¤er of 175, or even the value of the buyer 150: This is a substantial deviation from the
theoretical prediction and it is worth investigating to determine why sellers are making such
low o¤ers. The key question is whether the sellers are making o¤ers more generous than
they have to, perhaps due to fairness considerations, or are the buyers rejecting more high
o¤ers than they should according to the subgame perfect prediction which causes the sellers
to best respond with lower price requests. Figure 5 does show that high o¤ers tend to be
rejected even from weak sellers and they might be doing this with high enough propensity
to make such o¤ers unprotable.
In order to answer this question we need to understand how a rational seller would
best respond to the buyers, given how buyers tend to make accept/reject decisions. Due
to the multi-dimensional nature of the problem, Figure 5 does not o¤er a detailed enough
perspective of the rejection probabilities as the buyer sees not just the o¤er but also the
auction close price - both of which may gure into the accept/reject decision. Due to the size
and sparseness of the full grid, we cannot infer acceptance propensities from the observed
data alone. We can, however, estimate acceptance probabilities over the entire space. We
have done so and present the estimated probability of acceptance15 for any combination of
auction price and o¤er (assuming a weak seller) in Figure 6. What we see is that despite
the subgame perfect prediction, o¤ers over 100 have a rapidly declining probability of being
accepted.16
Using this probability of acceptance, we can calculate the expected utility of any o¤er
from the point of view of a seller at a given auction close price and cost realization to
determine the empirical best response o¤er. In Figure 5 we provide one way of summarizing
these best response o¤ers as we include a distribution plot of what the optimal o¤ers would
have been for each of the cases in which o¤ers were made by weak sellers in the experiments.
What we observe is that there is a spike in optimal o¤ers in the range of 120-130 which is
well below 175 and also roughly corresponds to the peak of the distribution of actual o¤ers,
though the peak is more of a plateau as the bulk of the actual o¤ers, 62%, are in the
range of 100-140. In the third column of Table 8 we provide a pooled OLS regression with
standard errors clustered on the subject of the actual o¤er on the best response o¤er. We
nd that the actual o¤er is on average 90% of the best response o¤er and the di¤erence
is signicant (test of whether the coe¢ cient is equal to 1 yield a p value of 0.068). This
analysis suggests that while sellers were making o¤ers less aggressively than the theory
predicts, the main reason for this deviation from the theory is the rejection behavior of the
buyers making very high o¤ers not protable.
15The logit model is Accept = 0+1 price+ 2 price2+ 3 price3+offer, where price is the winning
low bid from the auction, and offer is the proposed o¤er of the weak seller in renegotiation. The dependent
variable was a binary indicating whether or not the buyer accepted the o¤er. Standard errors were clustered
at the individual level.
16Of course since these accept/reject decisions were not elicited using the strategy method it is not neces-
sarily the case that this estimated acceptance probability represents the true average strategy of the buyers.
The problem is that certain very high and very low o¤ers are not observed with much frequency. On the
other hand we do observe a great deal of heterogeneity in the o¤ers which should be enough to indicate
that for the bulk of the o¤er range we do have enough information to make reliable claims over the average
strategy of the buyers.
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Figure 6: Estimated probability of buyer accepting o¤er given a closing bid.
4.4 Analysis of Outcomes
In this section, we formally analyze price, e¢ ciency, and buyer surplus outcomes at the
auction stage and after any default or renegotiation. Table 9 presents six pooled OLS
regressions with standard errors clustered at the session level. The rst two specications
focus on auction price and nal price. In theory, the auction and nal prices should be
equivalent between the B and R treatments while the W&R treatment should result in the
lowest auction price and the highest nal price across all treatments.
Result 7 Auction and nal prices are equivalent between the B and R treatments. Auction
prices are lowest and nal prices highest in the W&R treatment.
Result 7 is in favor of the theoretical price predictions given by hypothesis 5 and is
supported by the coe¢ cient on the treatment dummy, R, which is found to be not signif-
icantly di¤erent from the baseline treatment (B) in both the auction price and nal price
regressions. The W&R treatment is the only treatment which is signicantly di¤erent from
the others which matches the prediction that the nal prices from it would be higher than
in the other treatments. Prices in W&R are signicantly lower at the auction stage than
all other treatments, and signicantly higher after renegotiation than all other treatments.
Models 3 and 4 examine e¢ ciency at the auction stage and nal e¢ ciency, respectively.
Recall that nal e¢ ciency only di¤ers from auction e¢ ciency when bidders default and
nal e¢ ciency is set to zero. Similar to what was observed for auction prices, we nd
no signicant di¤erences between the B, R, and W treatments for auction e¢ ciency. On
the other hand, auction e¢ ciency is signicantly lower in the W&R treatment. Default
was possible in the W and W&R treatments and as a result nal e¢ ciency changed from
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Price E¢ ciency Buyer Surplus
Auction Final Auction Final Auction Final
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lowest Combined Signal 0.344 0.314 -0.0007 -0.003 -0.344 -0.602
(0.037) (0.030) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.037) (0.104)
Random E¢ ciency 0.512 0.404
(0.102) (0.105)
Wealth, W 1.048 1.044 0.013 -0.162 -1.048 -24.49
(2.572) (2.564) (0.011) (0.024) (2.572) (2.361)
Renegotiation, R -2.083 -0.665 -0.002 -0.001 2.083 0.767
(1.751) (2.101) (0.013) (0.012) (1.751) (2.246)
Wealth & Renegotiation, W&R -33.49 17.67 -0.030 -0.098 33.488 -30.018
(5.847) (3.790) (0.012) (0.016) (5.847) (5.183)
Constant 40.22 42.05 0.521 0.74 109.78 125.697
(3.112) (2.812) (0.091) (0.118) (3.112) (6.717)
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,046 1,046
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Pooled OLS regressions on noted variables clustered at session level.
the auction stage for these treatments. The nal e¢ ciency levels of the W treatment
are signicantly lower than either the B or R treatments. Renegotiation did not help
overcome the e¢ ciency loss from default as the coe¢ cient on the W&R treatment is still
negative, signicant, and a larger magnitude that what was observed in the auction e¢ ciency
regression.
Models 5 and 6 examine the buyers surplus, which is measured (at the auction stage) as
the di¤erence between the buyers value and the transaction price. The buyers surplus may
change if the winning seller defaults, in which case the surplus is set to -25, or if renegotiation
took place and the surplus calculation uses the new transaction price. The buyers surplus
is an important indicator for whether or not the buyer should allow renegotiation in the
procurement process. At the auction stage, signicant di¤erences only exist for between the
B and W&R treatments, with W&R yielding much higher potential buyer surplus due to
the very low auction prices. That high buyer surplus is not realized due to the renegotiation
phase. In the nal surplus regression we nd that there is still no di¤erence between the
surplus achieved in B and R treatments, as expected, while there is a substantial reduction
in the W and W&R treatments below what is achievable in the B treatment. This is of
course due to the existence of weak sellers who occasionally default on projects. We can
test the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients from model 6 on the W and W&R treatments to nd
a lack of a signicant di¤erence (p = 0:319). The indication here is that despite the higher
prices paid in the W&R treatment, there is no drop in surplus to the buyers as there is also
a drop in the frequency of defaulting sellers. We hesitate to over interpret this nding too
much as an indication that renegotiation fails to harm buyers. This nding is to a great
extent dependent on how we parameterized the recontracting costs. By changing them we
could have likely ended up with a di¤erent result here. The important take away though is
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that even with the hefty price increase stemming from renegotiation that doesnt guarantee
that the buyer is worse o¤ as there is this important trade-o¤ regarding default probability
to consider. In this case we see that renegotiation may not be hurting buyers as much as
indicated by the prices but neither is it helping as the buyer surplus is not increasing.
5 Conclusion
The use of renegotiation following competitive bidding in procurement settings is commonly
justied as a way to help alleviate losses associated with the Winners Curse / underbidding
and prevent default by winning sellers who were unable to anticipate the full cost when
placing bids. Due to the potential of post-auction renegotiation changing incentives in
the auction, the e¤ect of such post-auction interactions should be analyzed carefully to
understand whether they will be e¤ective in solving the intended problems. If bidders
anticipate successful renegotiation, there is an incentive to strategically lower bids below
standard levels to provide credible commitment of post-auction default which confers upon
them a signicant advantage in post-auction bargaining.
We use a combination of theory and laboratory experiments to analyze the e¤ects of
post-auction renegotiation in procurement auctions with and without asymmetric bidders.
Asymmetry is introduced through wealth constraints where sellers di¤er in the ability to
sustain losses without bankruptcy. Weak sellers will default in the event of a loss, imposing
a penalty on the buyer and incurring a default penalty. Strong sellers will never default,
absorbing all losses.
Our experimental results provide strong support for the comparative static predictions
of the theory. First, in an environment with no wealth constraints, renegotiation is never
successful as almost all o¤ers made by strong sellers are rejected by buyers. As a result,
bids placed by strong sellers do not adjust to the presence or absence of a renegotiation
option. Weak sellers who cannot absorb losses are shown to shift their behavior substantially
between the situations in which renegotiation is versus is not present. As predicted, buyers
accept renegotiation o¤er requests by weak sellers quite often. This high acceptance rate
encourages bidding low to win and then using their credibility of default to obtain substantial
price concessions from the buyer. The end result is that weak sellers are substantially
advantaged in situations in which renegotiation is allowed as they win the majority of the
auctions and are able to negotiate very favorable prices. The upside for the buyers is that
the sellers default substantially less often and depending on the costs of default that might
be enough to o¤set the price increases. Such a determination depends on the utility function
of the buyer.
The important aspect of these results is that we nd little evidence that renegotiation
is used to correct for any problems stemming from the Winners Curse. The primary e¤ect
of renegotiation is to give those with the credibility to default an incentive to distort their
bidding behavior during the auction so that they can win and then bargain for advantageous
prices with the buyer. While renegotiation almost incidentally diminishes the number of
defaults, it does so in a way that does not deal very directly with the cause of the defaults
and can cause other negative consequences through the distortions in the bidding behavior.
There are certainly a number of di¤erences in the experimental environment specied
here and many external procurement cases. One key point is that the experimental design
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specied clearly whether renegotiation would or would not be allowed at the conclusion of
an auction. In the eld, many buyers may be less clear regarding whether renegotiation
would be considered or not. While this is certainly a di¤erence between our environment
and the eld, our results are still informative in regard to these situations. Sellers will form
beliefs regarding the probability with which they think the buyer might be willing to engage
in renegotiation and the greater that belief, the more likely sellers will try to exploit the
renegotiation stage as seen in our results. The clear indication is that buyers are likely best
o¤ by sending very clear signals that renegotiation will not be considered.
There are also practices commonly in use that may counter the adverse consequences
of renegotiation. One common practice is to discard lowbids from an auction. The rst
di¢ culty for a procurer in implementing this practice is to dene what lowmeans. Some
may just automatically throw out the lowest bid or a certain number of low bids. Other
rules involve discarding bids that are a certain distance below the average. In each case,
the idea is to remove o¤ers which clearly appear too low and are more likely to lead to
default. In certain cases, practices of this sort may be e¤ective. Of course the problem is
in determining which bids are too low. If the cuto¤ used is too high, a buyer could end up
excluding valid bids and paying more than necessary. If the cuto¤ is not high enough, there
may still be bids allowed which are low enough that a seller who wins could still establish
a credible commitment to default. So the likelihood of success of this method depends on
the procurer setting the threshold correctly. For a procurer who is well informed about the
likely costs of the project, this may be possible but an environment in which costs are known
up-front is not one in which the Winners Curse would be a concern . So the environments
in which a buyer could successfully use this practice are ones in which it likely isnt needed.
Another notable di¤erence with many eld examples of procurement is that our envi-
ronment does not allow for long-run, repeated interactions or the formation of reputations.
With repeated interactions, a norm may develop with sellers asking for renegotiated prices
only when necessary to prevent default and buyers accepting when the request appears cred-
ible. Cooperation could be sustained through some form of trigger strategy. While such
mutual cooperation is feasible, if a buyer has a seller with whom they have such a cooperative
relationship, that buyer is unlikely to be using auctions as a procurement mechanism since
they could just negotiate directly with the cooperative contractor. In some procurement
situations, auctions are actually opposed because they are thought to stie the commu-
nication and cooperation necessary to complete a project (Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis
(2009)). Alternatively, long-run interactions could also lead to the formation of reputations
in which sellers that are notorious for bidding low just to gain an option for renegotiation
could be excluded from future auctions. In situations where buyers would have this sort
of long run information on the behavior of the sellers, such exclusion is likely possible and
could be benecial.
Perhaps the best way to interpret our results is to note that they apply most appro-
priately to situations in which such long-term relationships arent likely to exist. In such
cases, both sides will act according to their immediate self-interest which leads to the pos-
sibility of renegotiation primarily serving to advantage rms with a higher probability of
default. These rms will then use their strategic leverage to obtain very favorable prices
upon renegotiation. While this may lessen the likelihood of default, it is not occurring in
such a way as to compensate for the Winners Curse. Consequently, in environments that
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are a reasonable match with the one studied here, low-bid procurement auctions with the
possibility of renegotiation should be avoided in favor of other contracting mechanisms such
as contingent contracting, performance bonds or average bid auctions.
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